Cultural Evolution

Mechanisms of the Evolutionary Adaptation of Ideology

A case study through the lens of religion.

Part I: Theoretical Foundations of the Cultural Evolution of Religion

The proposition that religions evolve is a foundational concept in the contemporary scientific study of human belief systems. This perspective does not suggest that religions are biological organisms in a literal sense, but rather that they are complex symbolic-cultural systems that exhibit “descent with modification”. Much like languages or technologies, religious traditions change over time, with new denominations and sects branching off from parent traditions, creating a rich tapestry of diversity. The academic field dedicated to understanding these dynamics, known as the cultural evolution of religion, seeks to explain the observable patterns of complexity, variation, and continuity in religious systems across different societies and historical periods. This report will provide a comprehensive analysis of the mechanisms that drive this evolutionary process, grounding its claims in the extensive body of research from cultural evolutionary theory, cognitive science, anthropology, and sociology.

Section 1.1: The Principles of Cultural Evolution

The cultural evolutionary approach begins with the observation that religious systems are not random assortments of beliefs and practices. Instead, they tend to appear as coherent “packages” that include beliefs in superhuman agents, ritualized behaviors, moral doctrines, mythologies, and shared values. The variation in these packages, both within and between societies, is not arbitrary but is hypothesized to be the result of discernible cultural evolutionary processes. These processes, which include natural selection between competing groups, biased adoption of certain ideas over others, and non-random innovation, shape the features of religious systems over time.

This framework is built upon the foundation of dual-inheritance theory, also known as gene-culture co-evolution. This theory posits that human behavior is the product of two interacting and parallel inheritance systems: the genetic and the cultural.1 While genetic evolution proceeds slowly through the transmission of DNA, cultural evolution operates through social learning, allowing for the rapid transmission of a vast body of knowledge, norms, and beliefs across generations. It is this second inheritance system that accounts for the impressive capacity of human populations to adapt to a wide array of environments.1 Religion, as a quintessential element of human culture, is therefore a prime subject for analysis through this lens.

The scientific study of religion’s evolution is an inherently multidisciplinary endeavor, integrating theoretical models—often grounded in mathematics—with empirical evidence from a wide array of fields. It draws on cognitive science to understand the mental architecture that makes religious concepts plausible, anthropology and history to document the diversity and trajectory of religious systems, and psychology to explore the motivations and emotions that underpin religious commitment. By combining these perspectives, researchers can move beyond simple description to generate and test falsifiable hypotheses about why certain religious forms spread and persist while others decline.

Section 1.2: The Central Debate: Adaptation vs. Cognitive Byproduct

A central and highly productive debate within the evolutionary study of religion concerns its fundamental origin: Is religion a biological or cultural adaptation that was directly favored by selection for the benefits it provides, or is it a non-adaptive byproduct (or “spandrel”) of other evolved cognitive faculties?

The adaptationist view proposes that religion evolved because it conferred a direct fitness advantage. This perspective has two main variants. The individual-level adaptationist hypothesis suggests that religious beliefs and behaviors enhance an individual’s personal survival and reproductive success, perhaps by fostering cooperation within one’s family or immediate social network. The more prominent group-level adaptationist hypothesis, most forcefully articulated by evolutionary biologist David Sloan Wilson, argues that religious groups themselves function as “adaptive units” or “superorganisms”.2 In this model of multilevel selection, groups whose religious systems are more effective at promoting internal cooperation, enforcing norms, and suppressing “free-riders” (individuals who reap group benefits without contributing) will outcompete and ultimately replace groups with less effective systems.2 While influential, this view has faced criticism for its reliance on the controversial mechanism of group selection and for being potentially tautological, as any surviving religion could be post-hoc labeled as “adaptive”.

In contrast, the cognitive byproduct view, most closely associated with cognitive anthropologists Pascal Boyer and Scott Atran, argues that religion is not an adaptation in itself.3, 4 Instead, it is an incidental but inevitable byproduct of our evolved cognitive architecture. Our minds, this theory holds, are equipped with a suite of mental tools that were adaptive for other purposes, such as detecting predators or navigating complex social landscapes. These tools include a “hyperactive agency detection device” (HADD), which predisposes us to see intention and agency in ambiguous events (e.g., a rustle in the grass is a predator, not just the wind), and a “theory of mind,” which allows us to infer the beliefs and desires of others.3 While adaptive in their original contexts, these cognitive systems also make us highly susceptible to forming and transmitting concepts about non-physical, intentional agents like gods, spirits, and ancestors. In this view, religion is “parasitic” on these pre-existing mental faculties.4

The most compelling modern scholarship has moved beyond a strict dichotomy, proposing a powerful synthesis of these two positions. This integrated model, advanced by researchers like Joseph Henrich and Ara Norenzayan, posits that religious beliefs originated as cognitive byproducts, but were subsequently harnessed and shaped by cultural evolution for their adaptive, group-binding effects.5 According to this view, the basic capacity for supernatural belief is a spandrel of our evolved psychology. However, once these beliefs emerged, different cultural variants of them (e.g., different gods, rituals, and moral codes) competed with one another. Over time, cultural group selection favored those religious “packages” that were most successful at solving the adaptive problems faced by expanding human societies, particularly the challenge of fostering large-scale cooperation among genetically unrelated individuals.5

This synthesis resolves the central debate by proposing a two-step process: cognitive byproduct gives rise to the raw material of religion, which cultural adaptation then refines into functional systems. This framework is crucial because it recognizes that the “adaptive traits” of religion are not necessarily innate biological drives but are culturally evolved strategies that exploit our innate psychology. This process of cultural evolution is significantly faster than genetic evolution, which helps explain the relatively recent emergence and rapid diversification of large-scale, moralizing religions in the last 10,000 to 12,000 years—a timeframe too short for substantial genetic change to be the primary driver.5

Section 1.3: Religion as a Group-Level Adaptation for Prosociality

The adaptive function of religion that has garnered the most significant theoretical and empirical support is its role in solving what David Sloan Wilson calls the “fundamental problem of social life”: how to foster cooperation and suppress selfishness in large groups. In small, kin-based societies, cooperation can be sustained through mechanisms of kin selection (helping relatives) and direct reciprocity (I’ll scratch your back if you scratch mine). However, as human societies expanded, these mechanisms became insufficient to prevent the breakdown of social order due to the problem of “free-riders”.

Cultural evolution appears to have solved this problem by producing religious systems that extend prosociality far beyond the narrow circle of kin. These systems achieve this through a suite of interlocking mechanisms:

Superhuman Policing: Perhaps the most powerful mechanism is the belief in powerful, omniscient, and moralizing supernatural agents who monitor human behavior. The belief that a god knows one’s thoughts and actions, and will deliver rewards or punishments accordingly in this life or the next, provides a potent and low-cost enforcement mechanism that promotes compliance with social norms even in the absence of human observers. The cultural evolution of such “moralizing high gods” is strongly correlated with the rise of large-scale, complex societies.6
Building Moral Solidarity: As sociologist Émile Durkheim first argued, shared rituals and sacred values serve to bind individuals into a cohesive moral community. Synchronous movements, emotionally intense ceremonies, and the designation of certain beliefs and objects as “sacred”—things set apart and forbidden—intensify group solidarity and create a powerful sense of collective identity.
Costly Signaling and Commitment: Many religious traditions require adherents to undertake costly, difficult, or painful actions, such as food taboos, time-consuming prayers, or extreme rituals. Costly signaling theory suggests these practices function as hard-to-fake signals of an individual’s commitment to the group.7 Because these displays are too costly for a non-committed free-rider to fake, they serve as a reliable way to identify trustworthy cooperators, thereby solving the problem of whom to trust in cooperative ventures.

These mechanisms, working in concert, transform religion into a powerful engine of prosociality, enabling the construction of stable, large-scale moral communities of genetically unrelated individuals—a feat that is otherwise a puzzle for evolutionary theory.

Part II: An Analytical Typology of Religious Adaptive Mechanisms

The framework of cultural evolution provides a powerful lens through which to analyze the specific ideological traits that contribute to a religion’s persistence and growth. The following analysis examines the 12 adaptive mechanisms proposed in the query, organizing them into four functional clusters: (1) mechanisms of transmission, (2) mechanisms of in-group cohesion, (3) mechanisms of institutional power, and (4) mechanisms of expansion and survival. Each trait is evaluated based on its scientific foundation in the scholarly literature.

Section 2.1: Mechanisms of Demographic and Ideological Transmission

This cluster of traits addresses the fundamental challenge for any cultural system: how to transmit its beliefs and practices to new individuals, both across generations (vertically) and to new populations (horizontally).

The most direct path to cultural proliferation is demographic. A belief system that successfully encourages its adherents to have more children who are then retained within the faith possesses a formidable evolutionary advantage. This pro-natalist strategy operates through a combination of doctrinal encouragement, social norms, and institutional support systems that lower the perceived costs of raising large families.

The scientific basis for this mechanism is robust and well-documented in demographic research. Globally, there is a strong positive correlation between religiosity and fertility rates. Projections from the Pew Research Center indicate that this differential fertility is a primary driver of future changes in the world’s religious landscape. For the period 2010-2015, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) for Muslims was 3.1 children per woman, followed by Christians at 2.7, while the TFR for unaffiliated women was 1.7.8 This demographic advantage is not merely a byproduct of socioeconomic factors; it is often an explicit goal of religious doctrine and practice. Many religions, including Judaism, Islam, and various branches of Christianity, explicitly encourage procreation. This encouragement is often coupled with theological skepticism toward contraception and abortion, which directly impacts family size.

The power of this adaptive trait is most clearly visible in specific high-commitment religious groups.

Haredi Judaism: Haredi (or ultra-Orthodox) Jewish communities are among the fastest-growing populations in the developed world, with an annual growth rate of around 4%.9 This is driven by an exceptionally high fertility rate, which, despite a recent slight decline, stood at approximately 6.4-6.6 children per woman in Israel and the United States in the early 2020s.10, 11 This is more than double the rate for other Jewish women in Israel.10
The Quiverfull Movement: Emerging from American evangelicalism in the 1980s, the Quiverfull movement is a modern, radical pro-natalist ideology.12 Adherents eschew all forms of birth control, viewing it as an interference with God’s will, and embrace the idea of having as many children as possible as a “heritage from the Lord”. This ideology is sometimes explicitly framed as a strategy in a “culture war,” aiming to win demographic and political influence over time.13

These cases demonstrate that pro-natalism is a potent evolutionary strategy. When combined with effective mechanisms for retaining offspring within the faith, it creates a powerful demographic engine that can ensure a religion’s growth and persistence over time.

The term “childhood indoctrination” implies a passive process of filling an empty mind with dogma. However, research from the cognitive science of religion (CSR) offers a more nuanced and scientifically robust model. This model suggests that religious beliefs are not simply forced upon children but are readily acquired because the developing human mind is cognitively prepared to accept them. This “cognitive receptivity” stems from a suite of evolved mental tools that, while adaptive for other purposes, create a fertile ground for supernatural belief.

The foundational idea is that the mind is not a “blank slate”. From infancy, the brain is equipped with skeletal principles and specialized “inference systems” that automatically organize experience and generate intuitions about the world. Several of these systems make religious concepts particularly intuitive and easy to learn:

Hyperactive Agency Detection Device (HADD): Humans possess a highly sensitive, evolved tendency to attribute agency and intentionality to ambiguous events.14 This is likely an adaptive byproduct of a system designed to detect predators or prey; it is evolutionarily safer to mistakenly assume a predator caused a rustle in the bushes than to mistakenly assume it was just the wind. This cognitive bias makes it natural to infer the presence of unseen agents—spirits, ghosts, or gods—as the cause of unexplained phenomena.
Promiscuous Teleology: Young children exhibit a strong and cross-culturally consistent bias to see the natural world as purposefully designed. They intuitively believe that things exist for a reason (e.g., “mountains are for climbing,” “clouds are for raining”).15 This teleological stance, studied extensively by psychologist Deborah Kelemen, makes the concept of a creator deity who designed the world for a purpose a cognitively natural and easily accepted explanation for origins.15
Mind-Body Dualism: Developmental studies, notably by psychologist Paul Bloom, show that children are “natural-born dualists”.16 They intuitively grasp the mind as being distinct from the physical body. This innate dualism provides the cognitive foundation for widespread beliefs in immaterial souls, ghosts, and the possibility of an afterlife where the mind/soul persists after the body’s death.16

While these cognitive biases provide the universal scaffolding for religious belief, the specific content is provided by the surrounding culture. “Childhood indoctrination” is the cultural process of furnishing a cognitively receptive mind with the specific gods, spirits, rituals, and moral rules of its community. This transmission occurs at a young age, before the full development of abstract and critical reasoning skills, which Piaget’s stages of cognitive development place in adolescence and adulthood. Beliefs acquired during this early, pre-critical period can become deeply ingrained and foundational to an individual’s worldview.

While pro-natalism and childhood socialization ensure the vertical transmission of religion across generations, proselytizing is the primary mechanism for horizontal transmission—the recruitment of new members from outside the group. For “missionary religions” such as Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism, which seek to gain new converts, proselytism is a central adaptive strategy for growth and expansion.

The process of religious conversion is a complex psychological and social phenomenon. Lewis Rambo’s seven-stage model provides a widely cited framework for understanding this process, outlining a journey that moves from the individual’s initial Context, through a period of Crisis and Quest for meaning, to an Encounter with a new religious option. This is followed by a period of Interaction with the new group, leading to Commitment and, finally, the Consequences of the new identity.17 Research supports this model, indicating that conversion is often precipitated by personal stress and facilitated by forming strong affective bonds with one or more committed believers in the new group.

The sociology of missionary work reveals the complex strategies and structures that facilitate this process. Missionaries often engage not only in direct evangelism but also in providing social services, such as education, healthcare, and humanitarian aid. This practice, while often genuinely altruistic, creates a dynamic that can be viewed as a form of social exchange, where material or social benefits are offered, implicitly or explicitly, in the context of religious recruitment.

Section 2.2: Mechanisms of In-Group Cohesion and Norm Enforcement

For a religious group to persist, it must not only transmit its beliefs but also solve the fundamental problem of social life: maintaining cooperation and enforcing group norms. This cluster of adaptive traits addresses how religions build strong, cohesive communities and deter the free-riders and dissenters who threaten their stability.

One of the most powerful mechanisms for fostering trust and cooperation within religious groups is the performance of costly acts that signal genuine commitment. This concept is explained by Costly Signaling Theory (CST) and the related model of Credibility-Enhancing Displays (CREDs), developed by scholars like William Irons, Richard Sosis, and Joseph Henrich.7, 18 The core logic is that “actions speak louder than words”. Performing an action that is costly—in terms of time, energy, resources, or pain—serves as a hard-to-fake, and therefore honest, signal of one’s true commitment.

This mechanism serves two intertwined functions: filtering out free-riders and enhancing belief transmission.

Filtering Free-Riders and Fostering Cooperation: By imposing significant costs on members, religious groups make it difficult for individuals who are not genuinely committed to join or remain in the group simply to exploit its benefits. Empirical evidence for this is strong. Richard Sosis’s historical study of 19th-century American communes found that religious communes, which imposed more costly requirements on their members, had significantly higher survival rates than their secular counterparts.19 His experimental work on Israeli kibbutzim further showed that religious males, who are the primary participants in costly collective rituals, behaved more cooperatively in economic games than secular males and religious females.20
Enhancing Belief Transmission (CREDs): Joseph Henrich extended this theory to explain how costly acts influence the transmission of belief itself. For beliefs that are abstract or empirically unverifiable—such as the existence of gods—learners are more likely to adopt and internalize the belief if they observe a trusted model performing a costly action consistent with that belief.18
Extreme Rituals and Physiological Bonding: The most dramatic examples of costly signals are extreme rituals involving pain and stress. Anthropologist Dimitris Xygalatas has used biometric sensors to study such rituals, providing physiological evidence for their powerful bonding effects. During high-arousal events like fire-walking, he found that the heart rates of performers and their socially-connected spectators become synchronized.21 Furthermore, the level of pain experienced during these rituals correlates directly with increased prosocial behavior, such as larger donations to the community.22

The Supernatural Punishment Hypothesis posits that the cultural evolution of beliefs in powerful, knowledgeable, and punitive supernatural agents was a key innovation that allowed for the stability of large-scale societies.6 The belief in an omniscient god who sees all actions and punishes transgressions—either in this life or an eternal afterlife—effectively outsources the cost of monitoring and punishment to an unseen agent. This “superhuman policing” makes individuals regulate their own behavior for fear of divine retribution.

Cross-cultural and historical evidence strongly supports this hypothesis. The presence of such “moralizing high gods” (MHGs) is robustly correlated with measures of societal scale and political complexity.6 Experimental studies further reveal the psychological power of this mechanism. Priming individuals with concepts related to supernatural punishment has been shown to reduce rates of cheating.23 Evidence suggests that the threat of punishment (the “stick”) is a more potent motivator for prosocial behavior than the promise of reward (the “carrot”). Studies by Azim Shariff and Ara Norenzayan found that activating beliefs in a punishing god decreased cheating, leading to the conclusion that “hell is stronger than heaven” in promoting norm-adherence.24 This belief system is not without psychological cost, as the concept of eternal torment can induce significant “hell anxiety.”

Complementing the threat of supernatural punishment is the very real threat of social punishment. Social ostracism, which includes practices like shunning and formal excommunication, is one of the most powerful tools religious groups wield to maintain cohesion and enforce conformity. This mechanism leverages the fundamental and evolutionarily ancient human need for social belonging.

Consequently, the human brain has evolved to be exquisitely sensitive to social rejection. Psychological research, particularly by Naomi Eisenberger and colleagues, demonstrates that being ignored or excluded activates the same neural pathways associated with physical pain, such as the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex.25 This “social pain” is a powerful, reflexive response to a perceived threat to one’s inclusionary status.

The long-term psychological effects of sustained ostracism are devastating. Studies of former members of high-control religious groups that practice shunning, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses, document profound and lasting harm, including severe depression, anxiety, loneliness, and a loss of self-esteem.26 This experience is often described as a “social death.” From a functional perspective, the very severity of these consequences is what makes shunning such an effective mechanism of social control, as it makes the cost of exit extraordinarily high.

Section 2.3: Mechanisms of Institutional Power and Persistence

Beyond transmitting beliefs and maintaining internal cohesion, successful religions must establish and defend institutional structures that ensure their long-term viability. This cluster of traits focuses on how religious organizations consolidate authority, manage challenges, and secure necessary resources.

A common trait observed in many religious systems is a structural tension with, or outright discouragement of, analytical reasoning that could lead to doubt. This can be understood as a systemic property arising from the cognitive foundations of religious belief itself.

The scientific basis for this lies in dual-process theories of cognition, which distinguish between intuitive “System 1” and analytical “System 2” thinking. As established by CSR, many core religious beliefs are cognitively “natural” because they are products of our intuitive System 1 faculties. Analytical thinking serves to override these intuitions. This creates an inherent conflict. Empirical research by Will Gervais, Ara Norenzayan, and others has found a robust negative correlation between measures of analytical thinking and levels of religious belief.27 Furthermore, experimentally priming individuals to engage in analytical thought has been shown to temporarily decrease their self-reported religious conviction.27

For a religious institution to persist, it must establish and protect its source of authority. The sociological framework for understanding this process begins with Max Weber’s concept of charismatic authority.28 Many religious movements are founded by a charismatic leader whose authority derives from perceived extraordinary personal qualities. This authority is inherently unstable. For the movement to survive the founder’s death, this personal charisma must be routinized—transferred to a durable institution.28 This is typically achieved by codifying teachings into sacred texts, establishing a formal clergy, and creating religious law. The authority then resides not in a person, but in the office they hold. Consequently, defending the reputation of the founder and the integrity of the institution becomes paramount.

To maintain cohesion, religious groups must also manage internal dissent. Strategies vary widely, from tolerating diverse views to actively suppressing any deviation from orthodoxy through sanctions like social pressure or excommunication. The goal is to neutralize challenges that could undermine the group’s core beliefs and power structure.

From a pragmatic, evolutionary perspective, a religious system cannot persist without a reliable stream of resources. Fundraising is the adaptive mechanism that fuels the entire enterprise.

The economic scale of religious fundraising is immense. In the United States, voluntary donations to religious organizations consistently represent the single largest category of all charitable giving.29 The practice of tithing—giving a set percentage of one’s income—and other forms of regular giving serve a dual function. Economically, they provide a predictable revenue stream. Psychologically, the act of regular financial sacrifice functions as a powerful commitment device and a costly signal.

Sociological and economic studies have identified several key predictors of religious giving. Theological conservatism is strongly correlated with higher levels of giving, a finding consistent with Laurence Iannaccone’s “strictness theory,” which posits that high-demand groups foster higher levels of member commitment, which translates into greater financial support.30

Section 2.4: Mechanisms of Expansion and Long-Term Survival

The final cluster of traits addresses how religions expand their territory, compete with rival groups, and adapt over long timescales to ensure their survival in a changing world.

While often viewed as an aberration, violence has been a central and recurring feature of religion throughout human history and can be understood as a potent mechanism for intergroup competition. Religion does not necessarily cause conflict, but it can act as a powerful catalyst, intensifying in-group solidarity and out-group hostility to a degree that provides a decisive advantage in warfare.31 Religion enhances a group’s military capability by providing moral justification for conflict, framing it as a cosmic struggle, and by promising supernatural rewards for martyrdom, which can motivate soldiers to undertake acts of extreme self-sacrifice.31

A religion achieves its greatest stability when its norms and institutions become deeply integrated into the fabric of a society. This integration often occurs through the co-evolution of religious institutions with the state and its legal systems. Throughout history, many of the world’s most influential legal codes were derived directly from or heavily influenced by religious doctrine, such as Islamic Sharia and medieval Christian Canon Law. When a religion achieves the status of a state religion, it can leverage state power to enforce its doctrines, fund its institutions, and suppress rivals. Its tenets are taught in schools, its holidays are integrated into the national calendar, and its symbols become symbols of national identity, creating a powerful cultural inertia.

From an evolutionary standpoint, long-term survival requires the capacity to adapt. For religions, the environment is social, cultural, and intellectual. Adaptability is therefore a crucial “meta-trait.” A religion that cannot evolve its doctrines and practices in response to new social realities and scientific discoveries risks becoming irrelevant.

Doctrines are not static. They evolve through processes of reinterpretation and theological debate. For instance, the rise of modern science posed a profound challenge to traditional creation narratives. Many religious traditions have adapted by embracing forms of theistic evolution, which reconciles their faith with scientific findings by positing that evolution is the mechanism through which a divine creator works.32 This adaptation allows the religion to maintain intellectual credibility in a scientific age.

Another key adaptive process is schism, which can be seen as a cultural analog to speciation in biological evolution.33 Doctrinal or political disagreements can lead to a religious body splitting into new groups. While this may seem like a failure, it is often an adaptive process of diversification. The new branches can adapt to different social or cultural niches, allowing the broader religious tradition to appeal to a wider range of people. The Protestant Reformation is a classic example of a massive schism that led to a proliferation of new Christian denominations.33

Part III: Synthesis and Concluding Analysis

Section 3.1: Evaluating the Typology’s Completeness and Coherence

The provided twelve-point typology of religious adaptive traits proves to be remarkably comprehensive and well-aligned with the primary findings of the modern scientific study of religion. Each proposed mechanism finds substantial support in the scholarly literature of cultural evolution, cognitive science, sociology, and psychology. The list effectively captures the key strategies that religious systems have evolved.

The primary limitation of the typology is not in its content but in its structure, as it obscures the deep interconnections between the traits. A more coherent framework, such as the one used in this report which clusters the traits by function, provides a clearer understanding of how these mechanisms operate as an integrated whole.

Furthermore, the typology could be enhanced by more explicitly including the role of individual psychological benefits. The scholarly literature documents a robust connection between religious belief and practice and positive outcomes for individuals, including improved mental and physical health, a greater sense of meaning and purpose, and enhanced psychological well-being.34 These benefits can be seen as an adaptive advantage at the individual level, increasing an adherent’s resilience and fitness, and warrant explicit inclusion in a complete typology.

Section 3.2: Conclusion—Religion as a Complex Adaptive System

The evolutionary study of religion reveals it to be one of the most powerful and sophisticated creations of human culture. It is a complex adaptive system—an intricate tapestry woven from the threads of our evolved cognitive predispositions and the culturally evolved beliefs, rituals, and institutions that have been selected for over millennia. Its success lies in a multi-faceted suite of interlocking mechanisms that operate at the demographic, psychological, social, and institutional levels.

This evolutionary framework offers a powerful scientific lens for understanding a fundamental aspect of the human experience. It must be emphasized that this analysis is epistemologically neutral regarding the metaphysical truth claims of any religion. Its purpose is not to validate or debunk any particular faith. Instead, it seeks to explain why humans are religious and how religious systems function with such enduring success. From a cultural evolutionary perspective, the fitness of a religion is not measured by its correspondence to objective reality, but by its success in solving the adaptive challenges of social life—its ability to be transmitted, to foster cooperation, and to ensure its own survival across the generations.

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