Negative Partisanship and the Remaking of the American Political Landscape

1. Introduction: The Theoretical Foundations of Negative Partisanship

1.1. Defining Negative Partisanship: From Observation to Theory

The study of American political behavior has, for much of the 20th century, focused on the positive attachments citizens form with political parties. This traditional view posits partisanship as a form of psychological affinity, a stable identification with a party’s platform, candidates, and coalition. However, a parallel and increasingly dominant force has emerged in the American electorate, one that reorients the primary motivation for political action from support to opposition. This phenomenon, known as negative partisanship, is the tendency for voters to form their political opinions and make their electoral choices primarily in opposition to the parties and candidates they dislike.1 It represents a shift from voting for a preferred candidate to voting against a despised one, an electoral choice driven more by antipathy toward an out-party than by affinity for an in-party.2

The scholarly lineage of this concept can be traced to the mid-20th century. While the first empirical work to explicitly use the term “negative voting” was published by Samuel Kernell in 1977, its intellectual roots go back further.3 Political scientist V. O. Key Jr. presciently observed in 1966 that “the people only vote against; never for,” a succinct, if aphoristic, encapsulation of the core idea.3 This notion challenged the prevailing rational-choice models of voting by suggesting that the electorate’s motivation was not always a positive endorsement of the most-liked candidate. The formalization of this concept began in earnest with Michael Maggiotto and James Piereson’s 1977 “hostility hypothesis”.3 Drawing on an often-overlooked passage in the seminal 1960 work The American Voter, which noted that individuals can develop identifications that are “positive or negative,“4 Maggiotto and Piereson argued that negative partisan attitudes are an intrinsic and, crucially, independent component of party identification.3 Their research demonstrated that the likelihood of a voter defecting from their party was inversely related to the degree of hostility they felt toward the opposition. This was a groundbreaking insight: dislike for the “other side” was not merely a mirror image of affection for one’s own but a distinct and powerful variable in its own right.4

This decoupling of positive and negative sentiment is the theoretical key to understanding the modern political landscape. It provides a framework for explaining why a political strategist might find it more effective to increase a voter’s loyalty not by making them love their own party more, but by cultivating their hatred and fear of the opposing party. This conceptual distinction allows for a more nuanced typology of partisanship, separating it into several key concepts:

• Positive Partisan Identity (PPID): This refers to the traditional understanding of partisanship as a stable, affective attachment and sense of belonging to one’s own party.5
• Negative Partisan Identity (NPID): This is defined as an “affective repulsion” from an opposing party. It is more than a passing dislike; it is a stable, deeply held aversion that is resilient to new information due to selective cognitive processing.5
• Affective Polarization: This measures the growing chasm between warm, positive feelings for the in-party and cold, negative feelings for the out-party.7 Negative partisanship is the primary engine of this phenomenon. As the data in Table 1 demonstrates, the dramatic increase in affective polarization over the past four decades is not a symmetrical process. While partisans’ feelings toward their own party have remained relatively stable, their feelings toward the opposing party have plummeted, indicating that the polarization is driven overwhelmingly by rising out-party animosity.10

The work of political scientists Alan Abramowitz and Steven Webster has been central to the contemporary study of this trend. They define negative partisanship as the phenomenon whereby “Americans largely align against one party instead of affiliating with the other”.10 Their research confirms that since the 1980s, negative feelings toward the opposing party have become a more powerful force than positive feelings toward one’s own, explaining the modern paradox of why Americans who report increasing dislike for both major parties nevertheless behave like “rabid partisans” with record-high levels of party loyalty in their voting behavior.2

Table 1: The Growth of Affective Polarization in the American Electorate (1968-2020). Data shows the mean feeling thermometer ratings (0-100 scale) that partisans give to their own party’s presidential candidate versus the opposing party’s candidate. The widening gap is driven primarily by the decline in out-party ratings. Source: 11

This asymmetry is fundamental. The energy of the American political system is now derived less from positive, aspirational goals and more from negative, reactive emotions like fear, anger, and animosity. This dynamic explains why voters who may be unenthusiastic about their own party’s nominee will still turn out to vote with near-perfect loyalty; their motivation is not to advance a cause they love but to block an outcome they dread.10

1.2. The Psychological Architecture of Political Animosity

The potency of negative partisanship is not merely a product of political strategy; it is rooted in deep-seated psychological mechanisms that govern group identity, emotional response, and information processing. Understanding this psychological architecture is essential to grasping why appeals to out-group animosity are so effective and why the resulting divisions are so persistent.

The most foundational psychological framework is Social Identity Theory (SIT), developed by Henri Tajfel and John Turner.14 SIT posits that a significant part of an individual’s self-concept and self-esteem is derived from their membership in social groups.15 To enhance their self-esteem, individuals are motivated to see their own group (the in-group) as superior to other groups (the out-groups). This cognitive process of categorization naturally leads to in-group favoritism and, critically, out-group derogation.8 In the political realm, when party affiliation becomes a salient social identity, it triggers this “us versus them” mindset. Partisans begin to view the political landscape not as a debate over policy but as a conflict between tribes, where the success of the out-group is a direct threat to the status and identity of the in-group. Some research extends this, arguing that identity can even form in opposition to a disliked group, making the rejection of “them” a core component of who “we” are.15

This dynamic is supercharged by a well-documented cognitive heuristic known as the negativity bias. A robust finding in psychological research is that “bad is stronger than good”.3 Negative events, information, and emotions have a greater and more lasting impact on our psychological state than their positive counterparts.2 In a political context, this means that fear of an opponent’s policies, disgust at their character, or anger at their perceived transgressions are far more powerful motivators than hope for one’s own party’s agenda or admiration for its leaders.12 This bias helps explain why negative campaign ads are so prevalent and effective; it is easier and more impactful to instill fear of the opponent than to build enthusiasm for one’s own candidate.3 The negativity bias ensures that once negative feelings about an out-party are established, they are psychologically “stickier” and more influential on behavior than positive feelings.

Finally, the rise of negative partisanship is inextricably linked to the role of emotion, particularly anger, in political decision-making. While traditional models of political behavior often emphasized rational calculation, contemporary scholarship recognizes that political choices are often rooted in intense emotional responses.17 Anger is a particularly potent political emotion. Research by Steven Webster demonstrates that inducing anger in partisans increases their expression of schadenfreude—a malicious joy felt at the suffering of political opponents.18 The current political era, defined by negative partisanship, creates a climate where such feelings are not only common but are actively cultivated.18 This emotional charge can override rational policy assessment, leading voters to make choices based on animosity and a desire to see the other side lose, rather than on a sober calculation of their own interests.17 When politics becomes personal and emotional, the goal shifts from achieving policy outcomes to vanquishing a hated foe.

1.3. Critiques and Nuances of the Narrative

While the theory of negative partisanship offers a powerful explanation for contemporary political dynamics, an expert analysis requires engagement with scholarly critiques and alternative interpretations that complicate the dominant narrative. The academic consensus is not monolithic, and several important nuances challenge the view that American partisanship is now exclusively or even primarily negative.

One line of critique argues that the prevalence of negative partisanship may be overstated. Research published in Nature Human Behaviour, for instance, used a variety of measures and found that for the majority of Americans, partisan identity is either balanced between positive and negative feelings or is, in fact, more positive than negative.20 These scholars argue that the negative partisanship narrative presents a departure from classic Social Identity Theory, which holds that in-group favoritism is the primary psychological driver and that out-group animosity is a consequence of this in-group love, not its cause.21 This poses a critical question about causality: Is out-group hatred the foundation upon which political identity is built, or is it merely a byproduct of a strong, positive in-group identity? This research suggests the latter, concluding that descriptions of American partisanship as primarily negative are “exaggerated”.20

A second area of nuance concerns the source of negativity. Research from Ohio State University, analyzing decades of American National Election Studies (ANES) data, found that it is political independents—including those who lean toward one party—who are most likely to frame their political choices in negative terms.22 The logic is that because independents start with an unfavorable view of both parties, their ultimate choice is necessarily a vote against the option they dislike more. Strong partisans, in contrast, were found to base their choices more on positive feelings for their preferred party or candidate (“in-group love”).22 This finding complicates the narrative that strong party identification is the wellspring of political hatred. Instead, it suggests that the act of “negative voting” may be most characteristic of those who feel alienated from the party system altogether.

Finally, scholars have raised important measurement issues that call for caution in interpreting the data on affective polarization. The most common measure, the “feeling thermometer” difference score, is constructed by subtracting a voter’s rating of the out-party from their rating of the in-party.21 While this captures a dimension of partisan affect, some argue it is not a direct measure of a “negational identity”—an identity built on rejection.21 Furthermore, research by James Druckman and Matthew Levendusky suggests that these feeling thermometer ratings may be more responsive to feelings about prominent party leaders (like the president) than about the parties as abstract institutions or the mass of their supporters.23 If true, the dramatic rise in affective polarization might reflect increasing animosity toward specific, highly visible political figures rather than a generalized hatred of ordinary citizens who identify with the other party. This distinction is critical for assessing the true depth and nature of social division. These critiques do not invalidate the concept of negative partisanship, but they highlight the complexity of the phenomenon and caution against a monolithic interpretation.

2. Historical Manifestations: Realignment, Race, and Strategy

2.1. The “Great Switch”: A Century of Partisan Realignment

The contemporary landscape of American politics, defined by its deep ideological and affective divides, is the culmination of a century-long process of partisan realignment. This “Great Switch” was not a single event but a slow, tectonic shift in the composition and character of the Democratic and Republican parties, a process catalyzed by the explosive issue of race and civil rights.24 Understanding this history is essential for contextualizing the strategic deployment of negative partisanship that would follow.

The story begins with the powerful but internally fraught New Deal Coalition forged by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the 1930s. This electoral juggernaut united disparate groups under the Democratic banner: Northern liberals, urban working-class voters, ethnic and religious minorities, and, critically, conservative, segregationist white Southerners.27 For decades, the national Democratic party managed this uneasy alliance by focusing on economic issues while largely acquiescing to the Jim Crow racial hierarchy that prevailed in the South.29

This fragile compromise was shattered by the Civil Rights Movement. As the movement gained momentum in the mid-20th century, it forced the national parties to take a definitive stand on racial equality, setting in motion a chain of events that would irrevocably alter the American political map. The timeline in Table 2 outlines the key inflection points in this process. The first major crack in the Democratic “Solid South” appeared in 1948, when President Harry Truman’s adoption of a pro-civil rights platform prompted a walkout by Southern delegates at the party’s convention and the formation of the States’ Rights Democratic Party, or “Dixiecrats”.30 This was followed by the landmark 1954 Supreme Court ruling in Brown v. Board of Education, which declared state-sponsored segregation in public schools unconstitutional and was met with massive resistance across the South.32

Table 2: Timeline of the Southern Realignment and the Rise of Negative Partisanship (1948-1994). This table maps the key events that drove the ideological and electoral transformation of the American South.

The decisive break came in 1964. Democratic President Lyndon B. Johnson, himself a Southerner, championed and signed the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964, which outlawed discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Johnson reportedly told an aide that in signing the bill, the Democrats had “lost the South for a generation”.33 His premonition was correct. The act, along with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, definitively aligned the national Democratic party with the cause of racial equality and federal intervention, creating a profound sense of alienation and betrayal among racially conservative white Southerners who had been the bedrock of the party for a century.24

The Republican Party, historically the party of Lincoln and emancipation, saw a strategic opening in this Democratic schism.24 The 1964 presidential campaign of Republican Senator Barry Goldwater was a pivotal moment. Goldwater voted against the Civil Rights Act, framing his opposition not in racial terms but as a defense of states’ rights and a stand against federal overreach.24 Though he was defeated in a national landslide, Goldwater carried his home state of Arizona and, significantly, five states in the Deep South—the first Republican to do so since Reconstruction.26 This electoral outcome, though a loss overall, was a proof of concept: it demonstrated that a Republican appeal to white Southerners’ racial grievances and resentment of federal power was a viable path to electoral success.32 The “Solid South” was broken, and the stage was set for a new political strategy based on mobilizing this disaffected bloc.

2.2. The Southern Strategy: Weaponizing Negative Partisanship

The electoral realignment of the American South was not a naturally occurring phenomenon; it was accelerated and cemented by a deliberate and highly effective political strategy. Building on the groundwork laid by the Goldwater campaign, Richard Nixon’s 1968 and 1972 presidential campaigns perfected what became known as the Southern Strategy: a conscious effort to win the support of white Southern voters by appealing to their racial anxieties and their hostility toward the national Democratic party.26 This strategy represents one of the earliest and most successful examples of weaponizing negative partisanship on a mass scale, transforming the Republican party and the nature of American political conflict for decades to come.

The strategy was not improvised but was guided by a sophisticated intellectual blueprint. At its core was the analysis of political strategist Kevin Phillips, whose 1969 book, The Emerging Republican Majority, became the “political bible of the Nixon Era”.38 Phillips’s work was a cold-eyed analysis of demographic and voting trends, arguing that the old New Deal coalition was collapsing and that a new, durable Republican majority could be forged by uniting traditional GOP voters with disaffected white Democrats, particularly in the South.40 His analysis was explicitly and cynically racial. In a 1970 interview, he stated that the key to winning the South was to understand that “the more Negroes who register as Democrats in the South, the sooner the Negrophobe whites will quit the Democrats and become Republicans. That’s where the votes are”.38 This was a clear articulation of a political strategy based not on winning converts through positive policy appeals, but on activating and harnessing out-group animosity. It was a direct application of the logic of negative partisanship: the goal was to amplify white Southerners’ hatred of the national Democratic party, now associated with Black civil rights, more than it was to make them love the Republican party.

The genius of the Southern Strategy lay in its execution. Nixon and his advisors, including Phillips and Lee Atwater, understood that overt, explicit racism would alienate moderate voters in the North and West.33 Instead, they employed a sophisticated system of “dog whistle” politics or coded language. These were phrases that sounded race-neutral to the uninitiated but carried a clear, racially charged message to their intended audience of resentful white voters.33 Key coded phrases included:

• “Law and order”: In the context of the 1960s, this was widely understood as a promise to crack down on urban riots and civil rights protests, which were often associated in the public mind with African Americans.26
• “States’ rights”: This long-standing term was revived as a code for opposition to federal civil rights mandates, particularly court-ordered school desegregation and busing.33
• Attacks on “welfare,” “busing,” and “government dependency”: These terms were used to criticize social programs and policies that were perceived as disproportionately benefiting Black Americans at the expense of “good, hard-working” white taxpayers.33

This strategy proved spectacularly successful. In 1968, Nixon, running against the national Democrat Hubert Humphrey and the third-party segregationist George Wallace, managed to win the presidency by capturing several Southern states.37 By 1972, with Wallace out of the race, Nixon won every single state in the former Confederacy in a landslide victory.31 The Southern Strategy had worked. It had successfully peeled off a massive, reliable voting bloc from the Democratic party and delivered it to the Republicans.

The long-term consequences were profound. The strategy cemented the link between racial attitudes and party identification in the American electorate. As Abramowitz and Webster note, this racial realignment transformed the Republican Party into a predominantly white party, while the Democratic Party became an increasingly diverse, multiracial coalition.2 Crucially, this was not just a shift in policy preference; it was a fundamental rewiring of American partisanship. The Southern Strategy injected a potent, identity-based animosity into the political system. For millions of new Republicans, their partisan identity was forged not in an embrace of GOP economic policy, but in a deep-seated hostility toward the national Democratic party, which they now viewed as the party of Black interests, federal overreach, and a threat to their way of life.33 This was the historical moment that transformed negative partisanship from a latent theoretical concept into the dominant, organizing force in American politics.

3. The Contemporary Arena: Political Theater and Its Consequences

3.1. Nationalization and Amplification of Negative Partisanship

The political logic that underpinned the Southern Strategy—mobilizing a base through fear and animosity toward a demonized out-group—did not remain confined to one region. Over the past several decades, this dynamic has “gone national,” becoming the standard operating procedure for both parties and the defining characteristic of American politics.13 The triumph of negative partisanship has been fueled by profound changes in the media landscape, the ideological sorting of the electorate, and the nature of political campaigning itself, resulting in a political system where party loyalty is absolute and animosity is the primary currency.

Several powerful forces have worked in concert to amplify and nationalize negative partisanship. Perhaps the most significant is the fragmentation and polarization of the partisan media environment. The decline of a shared, relatively neutral media commons and the rise of ideologically aligned news sources—from cable channels like Fox News and CNN to talk radio and countless online outlets—have created partisan “echo chambers”.2 Within these ecosystems, voters are fed a steady diet of information that confirms their existing biases and portrays the opposing party in the most negative light possible.8 This constant exposure to hostile narratives about the “other side” has been shown to have a significant impact on political attitudes and voting behavior, deepening the divide between Democrats and Republicans.2

This media effect is compounded by the ideological and social sorting of the American public. The two parties are now more ideologically coherent and distinct than at any point in the last century. Democrats are overwhelmingly liberal, and Republicans are overwhelmingly conservative, with very few moderates remaining in either camp.2 This ideological sorting has increasingly aligned with other social, cultural, and geographic identities. Partisans are now more likely to live in communities surrounded by like-minded people, with little to no exposure to those from the opposing party.7 This “partisan segregation” makes the out-group seem more alien, more threatening, and easier to caricature, reinforcing the “us versus them” mentality that is the hallmark of negative partisanship.

Political campaigns have rationally adapted to this new reality. With an electorate motivated more by out-group hatred than in-party love, campaigns have become increasingly negative and expensive. The strategic focus has shifted from inspiring voters with a positive vision to disqualifying the opponent through attacks on their character, record, and associations.10 This is a direct consequence of the psychological principles at play; it is more effective to mobilize one’s base by stoking fear and anger toward the opposition than by building enthusiasm for one’s own platform.13

The behavioral consequences of this system are stark and measurable. Party loyalty has reached record highs, leading to a dramatic increase in straight-ticket voting and a corresponding decline in ticket-splitting.2 For most partisans, crossing party lines to vote for a candidate from the opposing party has become unthinkable, an act of tribal betrayal.11 At the same time, negative partisanship has proven to be a powerful engine for political engagement. The intense desire to defeat a hated enemy is a stronger mobilizing force than the lukewarm support for one’s own side, driving higher turnout in elections and participation in protests.5 This dynamic also explains the seemingly unshakable loyalty of partisans to highly polarizing and controversial leaders like Donald Trump. For many of his supporters, attacks from Democrats, liberals, and the media do not weaken their allegiance; they strengthen it. The attacks serve as proof that he is fighting the correct enemies, reinforcing a bond built not on shared policy goals but on shared animosity toward a common foe.11

3.2. Consequences: Legislative Gridlock and Eroding Norms

A political system running on the fuel of negative partisanship produces tangible and deeply damaging consequences for governance and the health of the democratic process. When the primary goal of political actors is to ensure the defeat of the opposing party, the foundational activities of a functioning democracy—compromise, deliberation, and problem-solving—become politically toxic. The result is a descent into performative “political theater,” leading to institutional paralysis and the steady erosion of the unwritten norms that sustain democratic life.

The most direct institutional consequence is legislative gridlock. In a hyper-polarized environment, politics ceases to be the art of the possible and becomes a zero-sum game where one party’s victory is perceived as the other’s humiliating defeat.48 Cooperation with the “other side” is no longer seen as a pragmatic necessity for governance but as a form of ideological surrender or tribal betrayal.49 This creates powerful incentives for the party out of power to engage in systematic obstruction, with the goal of denying the president and the majority party any legislative accomplishments that they could campaign on.51 The result is the inability of the government to enact significant policy, even on issues where a broad public consensus exists.52 Scholarly research has established a clear and powerful link between rising party polarization and increasing levels of legislative gridlock. As Sarah Binder’s research shows, the level of gridlock in Washington has risen steadily over the past half-century, with roughly 75 percent of salient issues on the agenda now subject to legislative stalemate.51

Beyond institutional dysfunction, negative partisanship corrodes the very democratic norms that allow a diverse society to peaceably resolve its differences. Two norms, in particular, are under threat: mutual tolerance and institutional forbearance. Mutual tolerance is the idea of accepting one’s political opponents as legitimate adversaries with an equal right to govern. Negative partisanship replaces this with a view of opponents as immoral, un-American enemies who pose an existential threat to the nation and its values.13 This process of “othering” makes it difficult for citizens to accept democratic outcomes that favor the party they despise.23

This “us versus them” mentality can, in turn, lead partisans to condone or excuse anti-democratic behavior by their own side, so long as it is perceived as necessary to defeat the enemy.55 This can include questioning the legitimacy of elections, spreading misinformation, supporting political violence, and eroding trust in core democratic institutions like the courts and the electoral process itself.14 The effects of this dynamic are not confined to politics; they create a vicious cycle. Negative partisanship in the electorate incentivizes politicians to engage in obstruction and political theater. This behavior is then amplified by a polarized media, which further fuels voter anger and disgust with the other side. This increased animosity puts more pressure on politicians to act as “fighters” rather than compromisers, perpetuating a downward spiral of dysfunction and distrust.

The corrosive effects of this animosity spill over from the political arena into the very fabric of society, threatening social cohesion. The politicization extends to ostensibly apolitical domains, such as public health. During the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, highly polarized partisans were unable to differentiate between the country’s overall response and the response of the presidential administration, viewing a public health crisis through a purely partisan lens.57 This dynamic extends into interpersonal relationships, with studies showing a growing unwillingness among partisans to date, marry, or even befriend someone from the opposing party.6 This trend toward “partisan segregation”7 means that political identity is becoming a primary social cleavage, sorting American society into hostile tribes and making the trust and solidarity necessary for collective problem-solving increasingly difficult to achieve.59

4. Future Directions: Pathways and Perils for American Democracy

Looking forward, the persistence of a political system organized around negative partisanship presents profound perils for the future of American democracy. The primary danger is not necessarily a sudden, violent collapse, but a slow, steady process of democratic erosion.49 A system based on mutual hatred is inherently unstable because it incentivizes the violation of the unwritten rules of the game. When politics is framed as an existential struggle against an evil enemy, partisans become more willing to tolerate or even support anti-democratic actions by their own leaders—such as challenging legitimate election results, weakening institutional checks and balances, or engaging in political violence—if they believe such actions are necessary to prevent the “other side” from taking power.54 As comparative studies of other polarized democracies show, this is a common pathway toward democratic backsliding and, in some cases, a descent into authoritarianism.58

Given the deep structural and psychological roots of this problem, there are no simple solutions. Calls for greater civility or bipartisanship are unlikely to succeed as long as the underlying political incentives reward conflict. However, the scholarly literature points toward a crucial locus of responsibility: the future of American democracy will be shaped more by the actions of political elites than by the sentiments of ordinary voters.49 While voters are animated by partisan animosity, it is political leaders who ultimately choose whether to exploit that animosity for short-term electoral gain or to attempt to de-escalate conflict in the long-term interest of the country. If elites exploit frustrated citizens for a power grab, democracy becomes imperiled.56

The challenge is that the path of de-escalation is politically perilous for any individual leader, as it risks alienating a base that has been conditioned to demand conflict and view compromise as betrayal. Nevertheless, it is at the elite level—through changes in party primary rules, campaign finance regulations, or cross-partisan agreements to restore institutional norms—that any meaningful intervention must begin.61 Without a fundamental shift in the incentives that govern elite behavior, the system is likely to remain trapped in its current trajectory. As long as the mobilization of hate remains a more viable path to power than the hard work of governance, the cycle of negative partisanship will continue to turn, posing a persistent and severe threat to the long-term health, stability, and democratic integrity of the United States.

Conclusion

The analysis presented in this report leads to a sobering conclusion: the intense partisan animosity and political dysfunction that characterize contemporary America are not temporary, superficial, or easily reversible phenomena. They are the logical, deeply-rooted outcomes of a political evolution spanning more than half a century. The current state of affairs is the result of a causal chain that began with a strategic choice and has since hardened into a self-perpetuating system.

The theoretical potential for negative partisanship—the human tendency to be motivated more strongly by negative emotions and out-group hostility—has always existed. This latent potential was activated and strategically weaponized on a massive scale by the Republican Party’s Southern Strategy in the 1960s and 1970s. This strategy deliberately and successfully fused the powerful social identity of race with partisan identity, transforming the motivation for millions of voters from policy preference to a profound, identity-based rejection of the national Democratic party.33

This strategic choice proved so electorally successful that its core logic—mobilizing a political base through fear and demonization of an out-group—was eventually adopted as the dominant mode of politics at the national level by actors across the political spectrum.13 This nationalization was amplified and accelerated by structural changes in society, most notably the rise of a fragmented and partisan media ecosystem and the increasing ideological, social, and geographic sorting of the electorate.2

The result is the system we have today, in which out-group animosity is no longer just a political tactic; it has become a structural feature of the American political system. Negative partisanship is the engine that mobilizes voters, the force that disciplines politicians, and the business model that drives media engagement.2 It has created a vicious feedback loop: voters animated by animosity demand uncompromising “fighters,” who then engage in political theater and obstruction, which is amplified by partisan media, further fueling voter animosity. In this system, every actor—voter, politician, media outlet—is rationally incentivized to perpetuate the cycle of conflict. Therefore, the divisions that plague American democracy are durable, sustained by powerful psychological, historical, and institutional forces.

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