Subjectivism

A Philosophical Inquiry into Subjectivism: Metaphysical, Epistemological, and Axiological Dimensions

1. Introduction: Defining the Subjectivist Stance

1.1. The Core Tenet: The Primacy of the Subject

Subjectivism, in its broadest philosophical sense, is the doctrine that a particular class of truths—whether metaphysical, epistemological, or axiological (concerning values)—is mind-dependent. 1 Its central tenet is that our own mental activity is the foundational and often sole arbiter of reality, knowledge, or value. 1 This perspective posits that for certain domains of inquiry, there is no external or objective truth that exists independently of conscious experience. The individual who possesses unique conscious experiences—such as perspectives, feelings, beliefs, and desires—is referred to as the “subject,” and it is this subject’s internal states that are accorded primacy. 3

A famous literary encapsulation of this idea comes from Shakespeare’s Hamlet: “there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so”. 5 This slogan captures the essence of axiological subjectivism, suggesting that value is not an intrinsic property of objects or actions in the world but is instead conferred upon them by the mind. While this is the most common association, the subjectivist thesis can be extended to reality itself (metaphysical subjectivism) or to the standards of knowledge and justification (epistemological subjectivism). 2

1.2. Subjectivism within the Anti-Realist Framework

In the field of meta-ethics, subjectivism is a cornerstone of moral anti-realism. Traditionally, moral realism asserts that moral facts and properties exist mind-independently. 5 Moral anti-realism is the denial of this thesis, and it manifests in three primary forms: moral non-cognitivism, moral error theory, and moral subjectivism. 5

Moral non-cognitivism denies that moral sentences express propositions that can be true or false at all; instead, they express non-cognitive states like emotions or commands. 6 Moral error theory, by contrast, agrees that moral sentences express propositions aiming at truth, but argues that they systematically fail to secure it because no mind-independent moral properties exist for them to correspond to. 5 Ethical subjectivism carves out a distinct position. It agrees with realism that moral statements are cognitivist—that is, they express propositions that can be true or false. It also agrees that some of these propositions are indeed true. However, it breaks decisively with realism by denying that the truth-makers for these propositions are objective, mind-independent facts. Instead, for the subjectivist, the truth of a moral proposition is grounded in and constituted by the mental states, attitudes, or beliefs of people. 5

1.3. The Problem of “Mind-Dependence”

The definition of subjectivism hinges on the concept of “mind-dependence,” a notion that is itself problematically indeterminate. 5 A simple assertion that something is mind-dependent can be ambiguous. For instance, automobiles are designed and constructed by creatures with minds, and in that sense, they are mind-dependent creations. Yet, in another sense, cars are clearly concrete, non-subjective entities whose existence and properties are not contingent on any individual’s ongoing perception or feelings about them. 5 This illustrates that the philosophical significance of subjectivism depends on a careful disambiguation of the mind-dependence relation.

This conceptual challenge is deepened by what has been termed the “anthropological perspective”. 9 Any act of subjective “invention” can, from an external viewpoint, be the object of “discovery.” For example, in a Berkeleyan idealist universe where a table is merely an idea in Fred’s mind, an observing angel could still discover the objective fact that Fred is perceiving a table. The angel’s discovery is mind-independent from its own perspective, even though the object of discovery is a mind-dependent entity for Fred. 9 This possibility threatens to make the distinction between subjective and objective collapse, as any subjective state can be reframed as an objective fact for an observer. A robust subjectivist theory, therefore, cannot rely on a naive notion of mind-dependence. It must specify precisely what kind of dependence is at issue—be it constitution, causation, or grounding—and clarify from which perspective this dependence holds, in order to maintain a coherent distinction from objectivism.

2. The Varieties of Subjectivism: A Domain-Specific Analysis

2.1. Ethical Subjectivism: Morality as Attitude

The most widely discussed and debated form of subjectivism is ethical subjectivism. It is the meta-ethical view that ethical sentences express propositions that can be true or false, but their truth or falsity is ineliminably dependent on the attitudes of people. 6 It is a form of moral anti-realism because it denies that moral truths are mind-independent, objective facts about the world. 6 This general framework, however, accommodates several distinct and philosophically important variants.

2.1.1. Simple (Individualist) Subjectivism

The most straightforward version, often called simple or individualist subjectivism, holds that a moral judgment is a report about the speaker’s own feelings or attitudes. On this view, when a person states, “Stealing is wrong,” the proposition being expressed is equivalent to “I disapprove of stealing”. 10 This is a cognitivist position because the statement “I disapprove of stealing” is a factual claim about the speaker’s psychological state and is capable of being true or false. 10 If the speaker does indeed disapprove of stealing, the statement is true; if not, it is false.

2.1.2. Group or Cultural Subjectivism (A Form of Relativism)

Another variant extends the locus of attitudes from the individual to a larger collective. In this form, often associated with cultural relativism, the truth of a moral statement is determined by the predominant attitudes or conventions of a specific group, culture, or society. 10 For a cultural subjectivist, “Stealing is wrong” might mean “My culture disapproves of stealing.” Like individualist subjectivism, this is a cognitivist theory, but it grounds moral truth in a shared, intersubjective reality rather than a purely personal one.

2.1.3. Universalist Subjectivism (Relation-Designating Accounts)

A common misconception is that all subjectivism is necessarily relativistic. However, there exist sophisticated forms of subjectivism that are universalist, meaning they posit a single, non-relative moral truth for everyone. These are known as “relation-designating” accounts, where moral terms designate a relation to a particular, authoritative mind or standard. 14

A prime example is Divine Command Theory, which can be formulated as a subjectivist thesis: “X is good” means “God approves of X”. 14 In this framework, moral truth is entirely mind-dependent—it depends on the mental state (approval) of God. However, because God’s attitude provides a single, universal standard, the theory is not relativist. When John asserts “Stealing is wrong,” he says something true if and only if God disapproves of stealing, and the same condition applies to Jenny’s assertion. It is not possible for the statement to be true for one and false for the other. 14

Similarly, Ideal Observer Theory posits that moral propositions are about the attitudes a hypothetical, impartial, fully informed, and rational observer would hold. 6 Here again, moral truth is dependent on a (hypothetical) mind, but because the ideal observer’s reactions are universal, the resulting moral truths apply to everyone, regardless of their personal feelings. These universalist forms demonstrate that the core of subjectivism is mind-dependence, not relativism.

2.2. Epistemological Subjectivism: The Relativity of Justification

Beyond the realm of ethics, subjectivism can be applied to the theory of knowledge itself. Epistemological subjectivism is the doctrine that knowledge, truth, or—most plausibly—justification is dependent on the perceptions, interpretations, or mental states of the individual knower or their community. 15

2.2.1. Core Tenets

The core tenets of this view are that the subject, not the object, is the ultimate source of meaning and that the standards for what counts as a rational or justified belief are generated by the believer or their community. 17 Reality is understood through the lens of individual or collective interpretation, and there is no objective, mind-independent truth accessible to us without this mediation. 15 In this sense, the subjectivist’s belief determines what is seen, rather than the other way around. 17

2.2.2. The Challenge to Objective Knowledge

This position poses a significant challenge to traditional conceptions of objective knowledge. If what counts as knowledge is determined by individual perspective, it becomes difficult to establish a shared, common understanding of reality or to make objective claims about the world. 19 For example, in the debate over climate change, an epistemological subjectivist might contend that the “truth” of the matter is relative to different perspectives or value systems, standing in stark contrast to the scientific consensus, which claims to represent an objective fact about the world. 19 This can lead to a form of relativism where different interpretations of truth are considered equally valid, potentially undermining the basis for rational consensus and action. 20

2.2.3. Subjectivism and Skepticism

One of the arguments in favor of epistemological subjectivism is its ability to provide an attractive account of certain skeptical scenarios. 18 Consider the classic “brain in a vat” thought experiment, where a person’s brain is stimulated to produce experiences indistinguishable from normal life. In this scenario, nearly all of the person’s beliefs about their surroundings would be false, and thus they would lack objective knowledge. However, from their subjective point of view, their beliefs would be perfectly rational. The most plausible explanation for this is that rationality, in at least one important sense, is a matter of meeting subjectively generated standards. The envatted brain, though deprived of knowledge, is not deprived of rationality. This suggests that justification can be understood subjectively, even if truth and knowledge require an objective connection to the world. 18

2.3. Aesthetic Subjectivism: Beauty in the Experience of the Beholder

Aesthetic subjectivism applies the subjectivist thesis to judgments of beauty, taste, and artistic value. Its central claim is that aesthetic properties are not objective features of objects but are instead grounded in the subjective experiences of individuals. 21

2.3.1. The Nature of Aesthetic Judgment

According to this view, the truth of an aesthetic judgment like “The Mona Lisa is beautiful” or “This meal is delicious” is relative to the individual making the judgment. 22 Beauty and other aesthetic qualities are not “in the objects” to be detected, but are rather constituted by our preferences, feelings, and emotional responses. 22 When one makes an aesthetic claim, one is indicating something about one’s own subjective state, not describing an independent fact of the matter. 22

2.3.2. Heidegger’s Critique of Aesthetics as Subjectivism

The philosopher Martin Heidegger offered a profound critique not merely of aesthetic subjectivism, but of the entire modern discipline of “aesthetics.” He argued that aesthetics itself is a product of modern subjectivism, which reduces the work of art to an object for a perceiving subject and its value to the “state of feeling in enjoyers and producers”. 24 For Heidegger, this aesthetic approach fundamentally misunderstands the power of great art. He contended that a true work of art is not just an object that elicits a pleasant feeling; it is an event that “opens up a world,” disclosing a fundamental understanding of what is and what matters for a historical community. By focusing on the subjective experience of pleasure, aesthetics eclipses this world-disclosing function of art. 24

2.3.3. Higher-Order Evidence and Fallibility

Despite its emphasis on individual experience, aesthetic subjectivism does not necessarily imply that one can never be wrong in one’s aesthetic judgments. A more sophisticated analysis allows for the possibility of error and rational revision. 22 One can possess “higher-order evidence” that calls one’s own judgment into question. For example, if you find a movie brilliant but later learn that all respected film critics panned it, or you realize your positive judgment was based on a transient and irrelevant good mood, you have gained higher-order evidence that your initial aesthetic judgment might be flawed or unreliable. This demonstrates that even within a subjectivist framework where truth is relative to the individual, concepts of rational assessment, expertise, and fallibility can be coherently maintained. 22

3. The Historical Development of Subjectivist Thought

The philosophical doctrine of subjectivism did not emerge fully formed but developed over centuries through a series of conceptual shifts concerning the nature of the “subject” and its role in constituting knowledge and value. This history reveals a progressive deepening of the concept, moving from an initial focus on perception to an ultimate concern with passionate, existential commitment.

3.1. Ancient Precursors: Protagoras and the Sophistic Challenge

The earliest roots of subjectivism in the Western tradition are typically traced to the Sophists of ancient Greece, particularly Protagoras of Abdera (c. 485-415 BCE). 26 His famous dictum, “Man is the measure of all things: of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not,” is widely interpreted as the first major articulation of both subjectivism and relativism. 27 Protagoras argued that the interpretation of any experience is relative to the individual. For example, a room may feel warm to a person coming from the cold and cool to a person accustomed to warmth; for Protagoras, both are correct because their experience is the only available measure. 27 He extended this principle to values, suggesting that “right” and “wrong” are labels derived from individual interpretation and opinion, with no final, objective Truth to ground them. 27 This sophistic challenge prompted a powerful counter-response from Plato, who argued for a realm of objective, eternal Forms to serve as impartial standards for truth and ethics, thereby framing the objectivist-subjectivist debate that has persisted for millennia. 3

3.2. The Cartesian Turn: Descartes and the Foundation of Knowledge in the Cogito

While Protagoras planted the ancient seeds, modern subjectivism finds its definitive epistemological foundation in the work of René Descartes (1596-1650). 1 Through his method of systematic doubt, Descartes sought to demolish all uncertain beliefs to find an indubitable starting point for knowledge. He found this point not in the external world, but in the internal activity of his own mind. The one “unquestionable fact of our experience” was the act of thinking itself, famously expressed as “Cogito, ergo sum” (“I think, therefore I am”). 2

This “Cartesian turn” was revolutionary. It established the thinking subject—the res cogitans—as the primary and most certain entity, from which the existence of God and the external world had to be subsequently proven. 31 In Descartes’s philosophy, the human self becomes the only real subject, and the entire universe appears as a set of objects for its representation. 32 By grounding all certainty in the self-conscious individual, Descartes’s work changed the course of modern philosophy, establishing the primacy of subjectivity as the central problem and starting point for epistemology. 31 The subject was no longer merely a perceiver, as for Protagoras, but a rational, thinking substance.

3.3. The Humean Influence: Sentiment and the Projection of Value

If Descartes established the subject’s consciousness as the foundation of knowledge, the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776) was pivotal in establishing the subject’s feelings as the foundation of value. Hume is considered a foundational figure for cognitive ethical subjectivism because he argued that moral distinctions are derived not from reason, but from sentiment. 6

Hume developed a theory of “projectivism,” arguing that when we make moral or aesthetic judgments, we are not discovering properties that exist in external objects. Rather, the mind “spreads itself on external objects,” effectively “gilding or staining” a neutral world with the colors of its own internal sentiments of approval and disapproval. 33 A virtuous character trait, for instance, is one that evokes a sentiment of approbation in a sympathetic and informed observer. 6 This Humean move provided a powerful psychological mechanism for subjectivism, shifting the source of value from the world to the inner life of the feeling subject.

3.4. The Existentialist Culmination: Kierkegaard’s “Truth is Subjectivity”

The final and most radical stage in this historical development came with the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), who transformed subjectivism from an epistemological or psychological thesis into an existential one. Writing in stark opposition to the abstract, objective system of G.W.F. Hegel, Kierkegaard famously declared that for an existing individual, “truth is subjectivity”. 35

This provocative claim is not an endorsement of arbitrary belief. Kierkegaard did not mean that one can simply believe whatever one wants and make it true. Rather, he argued that the most significant truths—those concerning ethics and religion—are not objective facts to be dispassionately observed but are defined by the individual’s relationship to them. Truth is found in the how of belief—the passionate, inward commitment—rather than the what. 37 For Kierkegaard, to exist as a human being is to be a synthesis of the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the eternal, engaged in a constant striving. 37 Objective, speculative thought removes the individual from this existence. 38 God, for example, is not an object to be proven through logical analysis but a subject to be encountered in faith, which Kierkegaard defined as holding fast to an “objective uncertainty” with the “most passionate inwardness”. 36 In this view, the subject is not a perceiver, a thinker, or a feeler, but an existing individual defined by passionate choice and will.

4. The Meta-Ethical Landscape: Locating Subjectivism

To fully grasp subjectivism, it must be precisely located within the complex terrain of meta-ethical theories. This requires carefully distinguishing it from related but distinct concepts like relativism and non-cognitivism.

4.1. Subjectivism and Relativism: An Orthogonal Relationship

In both popular and philosophical discourse, subjectivism is often conflated with relativism. However, the two concepts are logically distinct and address different questions. Their relationship is best described as orthogonal, meaning they operate on separate axes and do not entail one another. 14

Relativism is fundamentally a thesis about the indexicality of truth. It holds that the truth of a claim (e.g., a moral claim) is not absolute but is relative to a specific framework, such as the standards of an individual or a culture. 14 A moral relativist might claim that when John asserts “Stealing is wrong,” he may be saying something true relative to his framework, while Jenny, asserting the same sentence, may be saying something false relative to hers. 14

Subjectivism, in contrast, is a thesis about the metaphysical grounding of truth. It holds that certain facts—in this case, moral facts—are mind-dependent, meaning they are constituted by mental activity. 5

The distinction becomes clear when considering that a theory can be one without being the other.

Universalist Subjectivism: As discussed previously, theories like Divine Command Theory or Ideal Observer Theory are subjectivist because they ground morality in mental states (God’s approval, an ideal observer’s attitude). However, they are not relativist because this single mental standard applies universally to all moral agents. 14
Objectivist Relativism: It is also possible to conceive of a relativism that is not subjectivist. For example, one could argue that the truth of “John is tall” is relative to a comparison class (e.g., professional basketball players vs. the general population), but whether John’s height exceeds the average of that class is an objective, mind-independent fact. 14 Similarly, one could imagine a moral theory where the rightness of an action depends on context-specific but mind-independent facts.

Therefore, the crucial distinction for characterizing moral anti-realism is the one between subjectivism (mind-dependence) and objectivism (mind-independence), not the one between relativism and absolutism. 14

4.2. Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism: Subjectivism, Emotivism, and Expressivism

Within anti-realism, a central fault line divides cognitivist and non-cognitivist theories. This division is essential for understanding the evolution of subjectivist thought, as non-cognitivism arose largely in response to the perceived failures of simple cognitivist subjectivism. 11

Cognitivist Subjectivism holds that moral statements are truth-apt propositions that function to describe or report facts about the speaker’s (or a group’s) attitudes. 6 The statement “Murder is wrong” is a belief that reports the fact of one’s disapproval.
Non-Cognitivist Theories, such as emotivism and its more sophisticated successor, expressivism, deny that moral statements are truth-apt in this way. They argue that the function of moral language is not to describe the world but to do something else, such as expressing emotion, issuing commands, or influencing behavior. 7 For an emotivist, “Murder is wrong” is akin to shouting “Boo, murder!”—an expression of feeling, not a statement of fact. 11

The following table clarifies these distinctions among key anti-realist theories.

Theory	Is it Cognitivist?	Meaning/Function of “X is wrong”	Are Moral Judgments Fallible?	How is Disagreement Explained?
Simple Subjectivism	Yes	It is a report of a belief: “I disapprove of X.” 10	No. If the report is sincere, it is true. This leads to the infallibility objection. 11	As a conflict of beliefs about one’s own attitudes. This is not a genuine moral disagreement. 43
Ideal Observer Theory	Yes	It is a report of a belief: “A hypothetical ideal observer would disapprove of X.” 6	Yes. An individual’s judgment can fail to align with the ideal observer’s attitude.	As a conflict of beliefs about what an ideal observer would approve of.
Emotivism	No	It is a non-truth-apt expression of emotion: “Boo on X!” 12	The question is moot, as judgments are not truth-apt and cannot be “mistaken” in the same way.	As a clash of attitudes or feelings, not a conflict of beliefs. 12
Expressivism	No (traditionally)	It expresses a non-cognitive, evaluative attitude or commitment toward X. 7	Yes (in sophisticated versions). One can have irrational or incoherent attitudes.	As a clash of practical attitudes or commitments regarding what to do.
Error Theory	Yes	It is a report of a belief: “X has the objective property of wrongness.” 5	Yes. All positive moral judgments are systematically false because objective moral properties do not exist.	As a conflict of beliefs, where both parties hold false beliefs.

This comparison demonstrates how theories like emotivism and expressivism were specifically developed to avoid the classic objections to simple subjectivism regarding infallibility and disagreement by jettisoning the claim that moral utterances are descriptive reports.

4.3. Subjectivism and Moral Error Theory

To complete the meta-ethical picture, subjectivism must be contrasted with the third major branch of anti-realism: moral error theory, most famously articulated by J. L. Mackie. 8 Error theory shares with subjectivism a skepticism about objective moral values. However, it takes a different path. It is a cognitivist theory, agreeing that our moral language purports to refer to objective, mind-independent facts. When we say “genocide is wrong,” we mean that it possesses an objective property of wrongness. The “error” component of the theory is the claim that this is a mistake: no such objective properties exist in the world. Therefore, all of our positive moral judgments are systematically false. 5

Subjectivism avoids this conclusion. It agrees that moral judgments can be true but relocates their truth-makers from the objective world to the subjective states of individuals or groups. While the error theorist claims our moral discourse is built on a fundamental falsehood, the subjectivist claims it is built on subjective truth.

5. Critical Analysis of Ethical Subjectivism

While subjectivism offers an intuitive explanation for moral diversity, its simpler forms face a series of powerful and widely accepted philosophical objections. These critiques have driven the evolution of the theory toward more sophisticated variants.

5.1. The Argument from Disagreement as a Motivation

A primary motivation for adopting a subjectivist stance is the empirical reality of deep and widespread moral disagreement. 44 Across cultures and even within them, individuals hold conflicting views on issues like capital punishment, euthanasia, and animal rights. Proponents of subjectivism argue that the best explanation for this persistent lack of convergence is that there are no objective moral facts to be discovered. If morality were objective, one might expect more consensus over time, as happens in the sciences. The observed diversity of moral beliefs suggests, instead, that morality is a reflection of varying subjective feelings, preferences, and cultural norms. 33

5.2. The Infallibility Objection

The most damaging criticism of simple (individualist) subjectivism is the problem of infallibility. 11 The theory holds that the statement “X is morally wrong” is equivalent to the statement “I disapprove of X.” If this is the case, then as long as a person is sincere and accurately reporting their own feelings, their moral judgment cannot be false. 11 This implies that individuals are morally infallible.

This conclusion clashes profoundly with our common-sense understanding of morality. We intuitively believe that we can be mistaken in our moral judgments. We can change our minds after learning new facts, reflecting more deeply, or gaining empathy. We might initially condemn an act, only to learn it was done in self-defense and revise our judgment. 43 The notion that our current moral attitudes are automatically correct and beyond error strikes most as a form of arrogance and fails to account for the possibility of moral growth and reflection. 43

5.3. The Disagreement Objection

A closely related and equally powerful critique is that simple subjectivism makes genuine moral disagreement impossible. 11 Consider a debate where Person A asserts, “Abortion is immoral,” and Person B replies, “Abortion is not immoral.” According to simple subjectivism, what they are actually saying is:

Person A: “I disapprove of abortion.”
Person B: “I do not disapprove of abortion.”

These two statements are not contradictory. Both can be true simultaneously. Person A is making a true statement about their psychological state, and Person B is making a true statement about theirs. There is no logical conflict between them. 12 However, this misrepresents the nature of moral debate. When people argue about morality, they believe they are disagreeing about a substantive issue, not merely comparing autobiographical reports of their feelings. Simple subjectivism, by reducing moral claims to personal reports, dissolves the very possibility of genuine moral conflict. 43

5.4. The Problem of Contradiction

A more formal version of the disagreement objection highlights a logical contradiction. If Person A believes “X is right” and Person B believes “X is wrong,” and subjectivism holds that both can be true relative to the speaker, then it seems to imply that a proposition and its negation (“X is right” and “It is not the case that X is right”) can both be true. This violates the law of non-contradiction, a fundamental principle of logic. 11 Any theory that entails that contradictions can be true is typically considered incoherent and must be rejected.

These devastating objections led to the near-universal rejection of simple subjectivism among philosophers. 43 However, the core anti-realist impulse behind it survived and evolved. Non-cognitivist theories like emotivism and expressivism were developed specifically to sidestep these problems. 11 By claiming that moral utterances are not truth-apt reports but non-descriptive expressions of attitude, they avoid the pitfalls of infallibility and disagreement. For an emotivist, a moral conflict is not a disagreement over facts but a “disagreement in attitude”—a clash of feelings or desires, which is a more plausible account of what occurs in moral disputes. 12

Furthermore, more sophisticated cognitivist versions of subjectivism, such as Ideal Observer theories, also attempt to overcome these issues. By grounding moral truth in the attitudes of a hypothetical, fully informed, and rational agent, they introduce a standard against which an individual’s actual, fallible judgments can be measured as correct or incorrect, thereby allowing for both error and meaningful disagreement.

6. Implications and Contemporary Relevance

The philosophical debate over subjectivism extends far beyond academic circles, carrying significant implications for law, social policy, and interpersonal dynamics. The theory presents a fundamental challenge to how we justify our institutions, conceive of social progress, and navigate our relationships with one another.

6.1. Subjectivism and the Law

The application of subjectivism to the legal sphere raises profound questions about the nature and authority of law. If moral judgments are ultimately subjective, then laws based on them may seem arbitrary and lacking in objective justification. 48 This perspective suggests that legal decisions are inevitably influenced by the personal moral beliefs of judges, lawmakers, and other legal actors, challenging the ideal of impartial justice. 49

This can be seen in high-profile legal cases where fundamental moral disagreements are at play. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Roe v. Wade on abortion and Obergefell v. Hodges on same-sex marriage can be analyzed as outcomes shaped by the justices’ differing subjective moral beliefs about privacy, liberty, and equality. 49 From a subjectivist viewpoint, the law becomes less a set of abstract, objective rules and more a reflection of the dominant moral sentiments of a society or its most powerful arbiters at a given time. 49 This challenges the legitimacy of law, particularly when it is used to coerce individuals who do not share the prevailing subjective morality. 50

6.2. The Problem of Moral Progress

One of the most significant challenges posed by subjectivism is its impact on the concept of moral progress. If moral standards are simply a matter of subjective preference or cultural convention, it becomes difficult to argue that changes in moral codes over time represent genuine improvement. 51 For example, the abolition of slavery or the extension of suffrage to women are widely considered to be instances of profound moral progress. However, if the moral code of the 19th century (which condoned slavery) was “true” for that society, and our current code is “true” for ours, on what basis can we claim that our society is morally better?. 52

Subjectivism appears to reduce moral reform to a mere shift in collective taste, akin to fashion changing from one decade to the next. It strips the concept of progress of its normative force, making it impossible to say that Martin Luther King Jr. was correcting a moral error rather than simply expressing a different preference. This implication is deeply counterintuitive for many and undermines the aspirational nature of social and ethical reform. 51

Subjectivism presents a fundamental paradox in its implications for social life. On one hand, it is often championed as a foundation for tolerance and empathy. By recognizing that moral judgments stem from personal feelings and experiences, it encourages us to listen to and respect diverse viewpoints rather than dogmatically asserting a single truth. 46 In personal relationships, it highlights the need to understand that partners may have different but equally valid feelings about issues like loyalty or honesty, fostering a more accommodating and less judgmental approach. 53

On the other hand, this very same feature can erode the foundations of social cohesion. If there are no shared, objective standards, resolving moral conflicts becomes exceedingly difficult. 52 When disagreements run deep, subjectivism offers no common ground for mediation or rational persuasion, potentially leading to moral fragmentation where different individuals or groups are unable to cooperate. 51 This lack of objective criteria can complicate everything from policy-making to maintaining unity within a diverse society. 54 The theory thus appears to simultaneously support the liberal value of tolerance while undermining the possibility of a just and cohesive society built on shared principles.

7. Conclusion: The Enduring Challenge of Subjectivism

Simple ethical subjectivism, in its most basic form, is widely considered an untenable philosophical position, largely refuted by the powerful objections of infallibility and the impossibility of genuine disagreement. Yet, the core impulse behind it—the attempt to ground truth and value in the conscious experience of subjects—remains a potent and persistent force in modern and contemporary philosophy. The historical trajectory from Protagoras to Kierkegaard demonstrates a continuous effort to refine and deepen the understanding of subjectivity itself.

The legacy of subjectivism is not found in its crude, abandoned forms but in the sophisticated theories that have evolved from it. Contemporary meta-ethics is dominated by debates around expressivism, quasi-realism, and various forms of contextualism, all of which grapple with the challenge of accounting for the subjective, attitude-driven features of our moral practice without succumbing to the flaws of simple subjectivism. 13 These theories attempt to explain how we can have meaningful moral debates, revise our views, and speak of moral truths while maintaining an anti-realist stance. The enduring challenge of subjectivism, therefore, is not a settled historical curiosity but an active and vital area of philosophical inquiry that lies at the heart of understanding the human condition in a world of diverse values and beliefs.

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